Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act by Black, Alexander C.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 11
Issue 2 Summer 1978 Article 8
Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence
(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
Alexander C. Black
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Black, Alexander C. (1978) "Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act," Cornell International
Law Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol11/iss2/8
DISCOVERY IN GREAT BRITAIN: THE EVIDENCE
(PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS) ACT*
As the volume and importance of international business activity have in-
creased, litigation involving multinational corporations has become more
and more common. Thus, the problems involved in obtaining foreign dis-
covery' are no longer simply of theoretical interest; they are increasingly
important to multinational corporations involved in international litigation,
to corporations wishing to avoid such litigation, and, especially in the case
of antitrust actions, to the U.S. Department of Justice. A new English stat-
ute, the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act,2 which sets forth
the procedures by which the British courts may order compliance with for-
eign discovery requests, is certain to have a significant impact on the availa-
bility of discovery in England for litigation in the United States.
3
* This Note was selected by the Cornell Law School faculty International Legal Studies
Committee as co-recipient of the 1978 Henry White Edgerton Prize in International Affairs.
1. The term "discovery" is often limited in English procedure to the production of docu-
ments. See 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1 n.l (4th ed. 1975). In this Note
"discovery" includes the gathering of information through depositions, interrogatories, and
production of documents. The term "foreign discovery" denotes an attempt by a party to an
action in one state to obtain information located in another state.
2. 1975, c. 34 [hereinafter referred to as the Evidence Act]. The Act replaced the provisions
previously contained in the Evidence by Commission Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 74; the Evi-
dence by Commission Act, 1859, 22 Vict., c. 20; and the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, 1856,
19 & 20 Vict., c. 113, and added new provisions conforming to the Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad, openedfor signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444
[hereinafter cited as the Hague Convention]. Preliminary Note, 45 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND 482 (3d ed. continuation vol. 1975).
3. The Act applies only to discovery pursuant to letters rogatory, which are "the medium
... whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another country, acting
through its own courts and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within
the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country." The Signe
(Tiedemann v. The Signe), 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La.), case decidedsub nonzm The Signe
(renamed Florida), 39 F. Supp. 810 (1941), aft'dsub nomi. The Florida, 133 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1943). See generaly Note, Taking Evidence Outside of the United States, 55 B.U. L. REv. 368,
372-73 (1975). Such requests are of course not binding on the foreign court; they are "made,
and... usually granted, by reason of the comity existing between nations in ordinary peace-
ful times." 37 F. Supp. at 820. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1784 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b);
14A BENDER'S FORMS OF DISCOVERY § 13.0513] (1974).
Letters rogatory are generally appropriate when the persons from whom discovery is sought
are not willing to disclose the information and must be compelled to do so by a court in the
foreign country. The "methods of procedure must, from the nature of the case, be altogether
under the control of the foreign tribunal which is appealed to for assistance in the administra-
tion of justice. [The requesting state] cannot execute [its] laws in a foreign country, nor can [it]
prescribe conditions for the performance of a request which is based entirely upon the comity
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This Note will examine the Evidence Act in the context of antitrust ac-
tions such as the recent Westinghouse uranium contracts litigation,4 the first
case in which the English Court of Appeal and House of Lords considered
the Act.5 The case highlights the need for foreign discovery,6 the mechanics
of nations, and which, if granted, is altogether ex gratia." E. WEEKS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF DEPOSITIONS § 128, at 151 (1880), quoted in Union Square Bank v. Reichmann, 9
A.D. 596, 600, 41 N.Y.S. 602, 605 (1896).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b), which provides for discovery by letters rogatory, also
permits discovery by notice and by commission from witnesses who are willing to testify. Use
of these other two methods need not involve foreign courts at all, and most of the problems
discussed in this Note would not arise in such cases. For a comparison of discovery by letters
rogatory, by notice, and by commission, see Note, supra at 369-77. See generally Sklaver,
Obtaining Evidence in International Litigation, 7 CuM. L. REv. 233, 234-42 (1976).
4. The Westinghouse litigation, encompassing at least 27 separate suits, involves contracts
made in the 1960's and 1970's by Westinghouse Electric Corporation to provide a number of
American utilities with uranium for nuclear reactors at a fixed price, subject only to adjust-
ments for inflation. Between 1972 and 1975 the price of uranium on the world market
skyrocketed from about $7 to about $42 a pound, and in 1975 Westinghouse announced that it
could not fulfill its contracts because performance had become "commercially impracticable."
Thirteen federal actions brought by the purchasing utilities were consolidated in the Eastern
District of Virginia, In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F.
Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975), and the case went to trial September 12, 1977, N.Y. Times, Sept.
13, 1977, at 47, col. 1. Four suits brought in state courts were settled, and three suits were
brought in Sweden. Cheeseright, R7Z stands in the shade, Financial Times (London), Nov. 8,
1977, at 14, col. 3.
In 1976 information was made public indicating the existence since 1972 of a uranium cartel
involving a number of multinational corporations and the governments of Australia, Canada,
France, and South Africa. See International Uranium Supply and Demand" Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comn on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-62 (1976) (testimony of Jim Harding) [hereinafter cited as
Uranium Hearing]. Westinghouse brought an antitrust suit in Illinois against 29 foreign and
domestic uranium producers. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 786, at A-3 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 15, 1976). The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice confirmed that it was conducting a criminal investigation of the cartel, id. at A-
4, and the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee began its own investigation, id.
No. 818, at A-12 (1977); see Uranium Hearing supra at 1. For a general account of the facts
leading up to the Westinghouse litigation, see In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Con-
tracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Ura-
nium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contract Litigation, [19771 3 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.); Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. &
Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 275-78 (High Ct. Justice 1977); Baker, Antitrust Conflicts
Between Friends: Canada and the United States in the Mid-1970s, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165,
187-89 (1978); Cheeseright, supra, London Free Press, Oct. 1. 1977, at Al,'col. I. See also
notes 6 & 7 infra. For general information about the cartel, see International Uranium Cartel-
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate
andForeign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Uranium Hearing, supra; TIME, Nov. 21,
1977, at 96.
5. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977), af'd [1977] 3 W.L.R. 492 (C.A.), rev'g on add'lfacts [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.),
6. Discovery of evidence concerning the existence of a cartel was relevant to Westinghouse's
"commercial impracticability" defense in the contracts litigation and was essential to Westing-
house's antitrust action. Much of this evidence, however, was located abroad. In October
1976, a federal court in Virginia issued letters rogatory to the Supreme Court of Ontario in
Canada, to the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Australia, and to the High Court of
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of the new Act, and the problems involved in foreign discovery, including
the political and economic issues that can complicate the legal question of
the availability of discovery. The Note will focus on the kinds of discovery
available in England to American litigants, the traps that can defeat discov-
ery, and how these traps can be avoided or exploited.8
I
VALIDITY OF THE LETTERS ROGATORY
The first possible challenge to discovery in England concerns the validity
of the letters rogatory.9 The technical requirements for requesting evidence
from a foreign court are set forth in section 1 of the Evidence Act. No spe-
cific form or content is required.10 The court to which the request is di-
Justice in England. The discovery sought in England included documents possessed by Rio
Tinto Zinc Corporation (RTZ), an English company thought to be a member of the cartel, and
oral testimony from certain RTZ officials. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract
Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 97-99 (H.L. 1977).
7. The English Court of Appeal in the Westinghouse case upheld the letters rogatory under
the Evidence Act, but at the ensuing depositions RTZ officials refused both to testify, asserting
the American fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and to produce documents,
asserting the English privilege against self-incrimination. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 492, 494-96 (C.A.), aft'd, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81
(H.L. 1977). The U.S. Department of Justice granted use immunity to the RTZ officials in
order to obtain evidence for its grand jury investigation of the cartel, see Letter from Hugh P.
Morrison, Jr., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. (June
14, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal), but the officials
still refused to testify, The Times (London), July 26, 1977, at 17, col. 7. The appeals from the
Court of Appeal judgments were heard in the House of Lords amid intense diplomatic pres-
sure from the governments of Australia, Canada, France, and South Africa to prevent the
British Government from allowing the discovery. Id. The Law Lords ruled that, because of
the grant of immunity by the Department of Justice, the testimony could not be compelled
under the Evidence Act. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978]
2 W.L.R. 81, 116 (H.L. 1977).
8. An examination of the legal ramifications in an American proceeding if discovery is ulti-
mately forbidden by British authorities is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); Note,
Discovery afDocuments Located4broadin U.S. Antitrust Liigation: Recent Developments in the
Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747
(1974).
9. For a definition and discussion of "letters rogatory," see note 3 supra.
10. Articles 3 and 4 of the Hague Convention, supra note 2, however, require that letters
rogatory comply with certain language requirements and that they specify certain information,
such as the identity of the authority making the request, the names and addresses of parties,
the nature of the proceedings, and the evidence to be obtained. Although these requirements
are not mentioned in the Evidence Act, they must be met since both the United States and the
United Kingdom are parties to the Convention, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444; [1977] Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 6727). See also RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 70,
rules 2-3. For a brief description of the usual form for letters rogatory under the old statutes,
see 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACrICE 1021-22 (1. Jacob ed. 1970). See also 2 id. at 41-42;
I. JACOB, CHrmrY AND JACOB'S QUEEN'S BENCH FORMS 776-84 (20th ed. 1969); 14A
BENDER'S FORMS OF DISCOVERY § 13.05, Forms Nos. 13.05:7 to :11 (1974).
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rected must be satisfied that the request is issued by "a court or tribunal
. . . exercising jurisdiction in any other part of the United Kingdom or in a
country or territory outside the United Kingdom"-a requirement that is
easily met.Il In addition, the evidence must be requested "for the purposes
of civil proceedings which either have been instituted before the requesting
court or whose institution before that court is contemplated."'12 Thus, the
first real hurdle is to show that the proceedings in the requesting court are
civil rather than criminal in nature.'
3
This ordinarily simple question may become complex and of great practi-
cal importance when the U.S. Department of Justice has a criminal investi-
gation of the same conduct underway, especially when the Department has
granted immunity from prosecution to witnesses in the private action in
order to secure evidence for a grand jury investigation. The granting of
immunity is arguably an attempt by the Department of Justice to use the
letters rogatory to gather evidence for the grand jury investigation, ' 4 in con-
travention of the spirit, 15 if not the letter, of the Hague Convention,' 6 to
which both the United States and Great Britain are parties, 17 and in direct
contravention of the Evidence Act.' 8 In fact, when the Department of Jus-
11. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 1(a). This requirement
would clearly be satisfied in any case originating in an American court. The status under the
Act of an administrative proceeding, however, if it arguably involves rulemaking or investiga-
tion rather than adjudication, is unclear. See also P. Amram, Explanatory Report on the Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 327, 342-43 (1973).
12. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 1(b). The term "civil
proceedings" is defined in § 9(l) as "proceedings in any civil or commercial matter."
13. Section 5 of the Evidence Act does provide for obtaining evidence for a criminal pro-
ceeding at the request of a foreign court. Here, however, the powers of discovery under the
statute are much narrower. The foreign criminal proceeding must have been "insti-
tuted"--precluding the granting of evidence for use by a grand jury investigation-and the
range of discovery is limited to examination of witnesses and production of documents. Id.
§ 5(l)(b)-(c); see note 18 infra. Thus, the U.S. grand jury investigating the uranium cartel, see
note 7 supra, cannot obtain evidence directly for its criminal investigation through the use of
this statute. In addition, no evidence can be obtained "in the case of criminal proceedings of a
political character." Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 5(3).
The criminal provisions in the Act are reenactments of prior legislation involving criminal
evidence and have nothing to do with the Hague Convention, supra note 2, which deals exclu-
sively with civil matters. See P. Amram, supra note 11, at 343; Preliminary Note, 45 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 482 (3d ed. continuation vol. 1975).
14. A variation of this argument is that the granting of immunity is an "intervention" by the
Department of Justice in the civil proceeding--an attempt to use the civil proceeding as a
criminal investigation. See Memorandum from Hugh P. Morrison, Jr., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Herbert Hansell, U.S. Dep't of State 1-2 (July 6, 1977) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
15. See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
16. Hague Convention, supra note 2.
17. 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444; [1977] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 6727).
18. See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, §§ 1(b), 5(l)(b); note
13 supra. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton declared that using the statutory procedures to gather
evidence for a grand jury investigation was "a purpose altogether outside the Act of 1975 and
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tice granted immunity in the Westinghouse litigation, 19 it openly stated that
its goal was to obtain evidence for a grand jury.20
On the other hand, certain factors militate against invalidating the letters
rogatory. The Department's role, if any, in such cases is much more limited
than in typical criminal investigations. If the United States is not a party to
the case, and if the proceeding is a bona fide civil case between private
parties involving no collusion with the Government, the litigation will be
conducted independently of the Department of Justice. Indeed, the Depart-
ment takes a certain risk in granting immunity, since its own lawyers have
no opportunity to examine the witnesses who are immunized.2' Moreover,
the Hague Convention and the Evidence Act leave the resolution of claims
of privilege from testifying under the law of the requesting state to the au-
thorities of that state.22 The Department of Justice, as the final authority
regarding the prosecutorial intentions of the U.S. Government,23 is clearly
an appropriate arbiter under federal law of the question of immunity from
prosecution, and, therefore, of the question of privilege from testifying.24
Indeed, the purpose of the Hague Convention was to facilitate the discovery
of evidence in civil cases in foreign countries.25 That goal could be severely
undermined if the Department of Justice were not permitted to grant im-
munity when a witness claims the fifth amendment privilege in a civil pro-
ceeding between private parties. Finally, testimony given in court or
pursuant to discovery is a matter of public record, and testimony given in
... one to which the English courts ought not in my opinion to lend assistance." In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 126 (H.L. 1977).
The Law Lords were divided on the question whether the letters rogatory were valid before
the grant of immunity, but they were unanimous in finding that after the grant of immunity
the letters could not be enforced. Viscount Dilhorne stated: "It cannot be right for a state to
seek to avail itself for the purpose of securing evidence for criminal proceedings, of the obliga-
tions accepted by another state in' respect of the furnishing of evidence for civil or commercial
proceedings." Id. at 107. Lord Wilberforce went so far as to conclude that "the making of
the order [compelling testimony and granting immunity] is a matter of government policy, and
not related to the civil proceedings in Richmond [Virginia]." Id. at 94.
19. See note 7 supra.
20. Letter, supra note 7, at 1. The Westinghouse litigation appears to be the first case in
which the Department of Justice granted immunity for witnesses in a civil action to which the
United States was not a party. See note 140 infra.
21. See Transcript at 18, In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,
M.D.L. No. 75-235 (E.D. Va., filed Dec. 23, 1975) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell
International Law Journal.
22. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(l)(b); Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 2, art. 11; see RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 70, rule 6(3)(c)-
(d).
23. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 7-8.
24. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976) (providing statutory bases for United States immu-
nity).
25. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19771 3 W.L.R. 430,
442 (C.A.), rev'don add'ifacts, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977); Hague Convention, supra note
2, Preamble.
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civil cases is normally available for use in criminal investigations. 2 6 Thus, if
the use of civil evidence obtained under the Evidence Act in a subsequent
criminal proceeding would violate the Act, no such evidence could ever be
safely taken. This was surely not the intent of the drafters of the statute, and
the Act contains no clause so limiting the use of evidence obtained pursuant
to its provisions.27
Further, as a matter of policy the grant of immunity should not invali-
date the letters rogatory. A litigant's right to obtain evidence under the stat-
ute should not be prejudiced by the fact that the evidence is also of interest
to the Justice Department. If a private party to a civil suit seeks evidence in
good faith pursuant to the Evidence Act, the procedures adopted by Ameri-
can authorities to settle the American privilege question should not affect
the production of that evidence under the Act. It is equally clear, however,
that the Department of Justice has an obligation to be cautious in its use of
immunity in a civil proceeding to obtain evidence for use in a criminal
investigation. 28 Criminal proceedings that might involve a foreign defen-
dant, particularly those concerning antitrust violations overseas, can raise
sensitive international issues, 29 and comity dictates that the need for the
evidence be balanced against the possible adverse reaction in the foreign
country to the ultimate use of the evidence.30
26. See Rush v. United States, 559 F.2d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 1977); 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1976).
27. A related argument made in the Westinghouse case was that Westinghouse really
wanted the evidence for its civil antitrust action in Illinois, see note 4 supra, an action that was
claimed to be penal in nature because of the claim for treble damages. None of the Law
Lords accepted this argument, and Lord Wilberforce, the presiding Lord, answered this argu-
ment in a manner that seems to undermine the logic behind their conclusion on the immunity
issue:
I need not express any opinion whether if the letters rogatory had been issued in the
Illinois proceedings they could be implemented in England, for I am of opinion that
the appellants' argument fails at an earlier stage. Unless a case of bad faith is made
against Westinghouse (which is expressly disclaimed) it is impossible to deny that the
letters rogatory were issued for the purposes of obtaining evidence in the Richmond
proceedings. The fact, if it be so, that evidence so obtained may be used in other
proceedings and indeed may be central in those proceedings is no reason for refusing
to allow it to be requested: all evidence, once brought out in court, is in the public
domain, and to accept the argument would largely stultify the letters rogatory proce-
dure. I must therefore reject this separate contention ....
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 89 (H.L.
1977). See also id. at 97, 126.
28. The effect of the granting of immunity in the Westinghouse case was aggravated by the
federal grand jury's subpoena requiring Westinghouse to produce the information obtained
through discovery. See id. at 93, 107.
29. See notes 118-20 infra and accompanying text.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965); id. Reporters' Note 2. See generally Stanford, The Application ofthe Sherman Act
to Conduct Outside the United States:A Viewfrom Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978);
Address by Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney General, before the American Bar Ass'n 3-4 (Aug. 8,
1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journa).
DISCO VERY IN GREAT BRITAIN
A second possible hurdle to the validity of the letters rogatory is the dis-
cretion of the English court in accepting them. Although the Evidence Act
does not explicitly state that the acceptance of the letters is discretionary,
this conclusion can be inferred from the language of the statute.31 Normally
the letters are accepted as a matter of course.32 However, where honoring
the letters rogatory would injure the public interest, a court may refuse to
honor them, despite the possibility that the refusal might offend the govern-
ment issuing the letters.33
II
TYPES OF DISCOVERY AVAILABLE
If the English court honors the letters rogatory, the next possible chal-
lenge is that the particular discovery sought is not available under the Evi-
dence Act. At first glance, the Act seems to allow a wide range of discovery.
Section 2(1) empowers the court to "make such provision for obtaining evi-
dence. . . as may appear to the court to be appropriate," 34 and section 2(2)
lists specific examples of permissible discovery, such as oral or written ex-
amination of witnesses,35 production of documents, 36 inspection of prop-
erty,37 and medical examinations. 38 These provisions alone significantly
broaden the type of discovery available under earlier legislation.39 Section
2(3), however, places a severe limit on the scope of discovery: it is available
31. Section 1 of the Evidence Act states that the British court "shall have the powers," not
"duties," appropriate to compel discovery, and § 2(1) likewise refers to the court's "power...
to make. . . provision for obtaining evidence." See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contract Litigation, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81, 101-02 (H.L. 1977). By contrast, other provisions of
the Act are phrased categorically: "[a]n order. . . shall not require," § 2(3)-(4); "[a] person
...shall be entitled," § 2(5); and "[a] person shall not be compelled," § 3(l)-(3). Moreover,
the granting of discovery in an English action is normally discretionary, rather than a matter of
right. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
32. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
33. The circumstances that would provoke a refusal by an English court would probably be
similar to those situations giving rise to the English public interest privilege. See notes 104-15
infra and accompanying text. The court's discretion would most likely be expressed not as a
refusal to honor the letters because of their invalidity, but rather as a refusal to allow the
particular discovery requested, see notes 55-64 infra and accompanying text, or as a finding
that the information sought is privileged, see notes 105-15 infra and accompanying text. Yet
when the American court in the Westinghouse litigation sent letters rogatory to the Supreme
Court of Ontario, the Canadian court in its discretion refused to honor the letters because the
request violated strong Canadian public policy. Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne
Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 290-92 (High Ct. Justice 1977).
34. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 2(l).
35. Id. § 2(2)(a).
36. Id. § 2(2)(b).
37. Id. § 2(2)(c).
38. Id. § 2(2)(e).
39. For example, cases under the earlier acts, see note 2 supra, held that third parties could
be required to produce documents only if they were ancillary to oral testimony. E.g., Ameri-
can Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Doe, [1967] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 222, 225 (C.A.); Burchard v.
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only through "steps which can be required to be taken by way of obtaining
evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings in the court making the or-
der.,,4o
The procedural rules for discovery in England probably contain few pro-
visions that would be unfamiliar to an American attorney acquainted with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 1 The substantive scope of discovery
in English litigation, however, is in some respects considerably more limited
than in American proceedings.42 The most significant example is pretrial
discovery, which is used much less extensively in England than in
America.43 Before the enactment of the Evidence Act, English courts
consistently refused to grant pretrial discovery requested by foreign
courts;44 in fact, the argument most commonly asserted to defeat compli-
ance with letters rogatory was that the discovery sought was pretrial.45 In
the Westinghouse case, the English Court of Appeal declared that the old
cases did not apply under the new Act, and that pretrial discovery would be
freely permitted.46 But the House of Lords took the opposite view:47 discov-
ery may only be obtained under the Act if it is shown-not merely al-
Macfarlane, [1891] 2 Q.B. 241 (C.A.) (evidence need not be produced under 6 & 7 Vict., c. 82,
§ 5 (1843)).
40. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 2(3). Another provi-
sion of the Act, § 2(1), further limits the scope of discovery to what "may appear to the court to
be appropriate for the purpose of giving effect to the request in pursuance of which the appli-
cation is made." This latter restriction, however, is subsumed by the general requirement that
evidence be taken according to English law, since under English law the availability of discov-
ery is always subject to the discretion of the court. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
41. See generally 17 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 292 (4th ed. 1976); see also W.
PARK, NOTES ON DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 37-43
(Oyez Practice Notes No. 58, 1967). An attempt to obtain requests for admissions under the
Evidence Act, however, would likely run afoul of the English privilege against self-
incrimination. See notes 81-82 infra and accompanying text; c. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a) (federal
rule on request for admission).
42. Seegenerally 17 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 292-400 (4th ed. 1976); Kaplan,
An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions ofEnglsh Civil Procedure, 69 MICH. L.
REV. 821, 824-26 (1971).
43. Kaplan, supra note 42, at 824-26.
44. The leading case on this point is Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1
Q.B. 618 (1955), which involved a request from an American court for documents and oral
testimony from directors of two English companies that were not parties to the American ac-
tion. The court did not allow discovery, holding that the applicable statute, the Foreign
Tribunals Evidence Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 113, § 1, allowed only "evidence which may be
used at the trial," not "proceedings for inspection and discovery before the trial." Id. at 648.
45. Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 285 (High Ct.
Justice 1977).
46. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 436-
37, 442-43 (C.A.), rev'don add'lfacts, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977). This view is supported
by the text of the Act; § 1(b) specifically states that evidence may be requested "for the pur-
poses of civil proceedings which either have been instituted before the requesting court or
whose institution before that court is contemplated." Evidence (Proceedings in Other Juris-
dictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § l(b). This is a marked departure from the language of prior
legislation, which referred to proceedings which were "pending." Foreign Tribunals Evidence
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leged4 -- in the letters rogatory that the information sought is to be used at
trial and is not being sought merely because it might lead to the discovery
of other information that would be used at trial.49 This decision reflects the
English prohibition of "fishing expeditions," and it severely narrows the
range of discovery available to an American litigant.50
Theoretically, oral depositions can be used freely; an English court may
order a deposition, at its discretion, in "any cause or matter where it ap-
pears necessary for the purposes of justice."'' l But in practice, the English
much prefer that testimony be given at trial, and courts generally order oral
depositions only in extraordinary circumstances-for example, if an impor-
tant witness cannot attend the trial.5 2 The examination of witnesses abroad
is an established exception to this rule,5 3 however, and a request for evi-
dence by letters rogatory would naturally fall within this exception. The
scope of oral questioning at a deposition is generally not limited as long as
the questions "fairly relate to the matters in dispute in the foreign action."'54
Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 113, § 1; Evidence by Commission Act, 1859, 22 Vict., c. 20, § 1.
The new language seems to anticipate the use of the statute in pretrial procedure.
47. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81
passim (H.L. 1977). Lord Wilberforce noted that
the Court of Appeal, while correctly stating that the Act of 1975 was a new Act, may
have been led to treat it as dealing more liberally than its predecessor with pre-trial
discovery. I do not so regard the Act: on the contrary, it appears to me that it takes a
stricter line.
Id. at 87.
48. Although two Law Lords were willing to accept the requesting court's statement of the
purpose for which the evidence was sought, id. at 110, 129, the other three Lords looked be-
yond the phrasing of the letters rogatory, which they noted were drafted by Westinghouse's
lawyers with an eye to the requirements of English law, id. at 87-88, 118. These judges looked
to the "substance of the letters rogatory"--that is, whether they were "calculated to elicit ... a
substantial quantity of material that would not be direct evidence," and "to the circumstances
in which they were issued," including a statement by Judge Merhige when he issued the letters
that "it may lead to something." Id. at 118-19. The burden of showing that the request is not
a "fishing expedition" is, of course, on the party seeking discovery. "If the court is not satis-
fied that evidence [for use at trial] is required, . . . however much the court may be disposed
to accede to the request, it has no power to do so." Id. at 96.
49. Id. at 101.
50. The English prohibition against "fishing expeditions" extends to requests that do not
adequately describe the documents sought. See id. at 99-100; note 63 infra and accompanying
text.
51. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 39, rule 1(1). The deposition may be
made at any place, either before the court or before a person named by the court. Id. Order
70, rule 4(l).
52. See, e.g., Bidder v. Bridges, 26 Ch. D. I (CI. App. 1884) (advanced age of witness);
Warner v. Mosses, 16 Ch. D. 100 (Ch. App. 1880) (general rule stated); Braun v. Molett, 16
C.B. 514, 139 Eng. Rep. 860 (C.P. 1855) (witness about to go abroad); Pond v. Dimes, 3 Moo.
& Se. 161, 2 Dow. P.C. 730 (C.P. 1833) (witness in precarious state of health).
53. See Coch v. Allcock & Co., 21 Q.B.D. 178 (C.A. 1888).
54. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19771 3 W.L.R. 430,438
(C.A.), rev'don addYfacts, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
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Discovery of documents, although used more often in English proceed-
ings than depositions, is still employed much less frequently than in Ameri-
can federal courts.5 5 Documents generally cannot be obtained as a matter
of right, but only in the discretion of the court.56 English courts have denied
discovery when they believed it was not absolutely necessary to the pro-
ceedings 57 -for example, when the information sought did not appear to be
relevant 58 or when the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case.5 9
Further, the courts are sensitive to possible inconvenience or unfairness to
the recipient of the request. They have denied discovery when the expense
or labor involved in production of the documents would be unduly oppres-
sive,60 when production would be vexatious or improper or work injus-
tice,61 and particularly when the documents were not sufficiently
specified 62 a requirement now expressly set forth in the Evidence Act.63 A
showing of such circumstances will not necessarily block all discovery; the
court may simply limit the request so as to prevent any oppression. 64 In
addition, since English courts generally grant discovery requested by for-
eign courts, 65 the person from whom discovery is sought would probably
55. Kaplan, supra note 42, at 424-25.
56. Kent Coal Concessions, Ltd. v. Duguid, [1910] 1 K.B. 904, 910 (C.A.), afl'd, [1910] A.C.
452; see Hope v. Brash, [18971 2 Q.B. 188 (C.A.).
57. See RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 24, rule 8.
58. Downing v. Falmouth United Sewerage Bd., 37 Ch. D. 234 (Ch. App. 1887); see, e.g.,
Kay v. Hargreaves, 14 L.T.R. (n.s.) 281 (V.C. 1886). The corresponding American rule is
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).
59. E.g., Philipps v. Philipps, 40 L.T.R. (n.s.) 815 (C.P.D. 1879); Lane v. Gray, L.R. 16 Eq.
552, 43 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 187 (V.C. 1873).
60. E.g., John Henry Andrew & Co. v. Kuehnrich, 29 Pat. Cas. 698, 701 (C.A. 1912); Petre
v. Sutherland, 3 T.L.R. 275 (C.A. 1887). The corresponding American rule is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c).
61. E.g., Attorney-General v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., [1892] 3 Ch. 70, aft'd, 72
L.T.R. (n.s.) 340 (Ch. App. 1895) (company not required to produce all its books to its trade
rival); Mansell v. Feeney (No. 2), 4 L.T.R. (n.s.) 437 (V.C. 1861) (defendant not required to
disclose business profits to an alleged partner). The corresponding American rule is Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).
62. E.g., Edmiston v. British Transp. Comm'n, [1956] 1 Q.B. 191 (C.A. 1955). The corre-
sponding American rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b).
63. Section 2(4) of the Act provides:
An order under this section shall not require a person-
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the order
as being documents appearing to the court making the order to be, or to be likely to
be, in his possession, custody or power.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 2(4).
64. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 24, rule 2(5); see Cory v. Cory, [1923] 1
Ch. 90 (Ch. App. 1922). The corresponding American rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c). If the request is too far-reaching, however, the court may refuse to grant it at all. See
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 88 (H.L.
1977).
65. "Judicial and international comity requires that any request of a foreign court for evi-
dence ... should be treated with sympathy and respect and complied with so far as the princi-
DISCO VERY IN GREW T BRITAIlN
have to show significant hardship in order for the court to refuse discovery
on discretionary grounds.
Finally, under English common law, discovery of documents is ordi-
narily available only against a party to the action.66 But the definition of
"party" for purposes of discovery is very broad.67 Additionally, there are
several exceptions to the general rule: (1) discovery may not be defeated by
placing documents in the hands of nonparties; 68 (2) nonparties must pro-
duce documents at trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum; 69 and (3) non-
parties may be ordered by the court to produce documents at nontrial pro-
ceedings. 70 Orders under the third exception include depositions at the re-
quest of a foreign court and have the effect of a subpoena duces tecum.71
The courts have construed this exception as requiring production of docu-
ments in the hands of nonparties only when the evidence is ancillary to oral
testimony72 and have denied discovery where the true purpose of the depo-
sition was to obtain discovery of the documents. 73 Nevertheless, it is not
clear whether an English court today would follow these rules, which were
developed by cases decided prior to the passage of the Evidence Act and the
signing of the Hague Convention.74 It seems more in keeping with the
pies of English law permit." Seyfang v. G.D. Searle & Co., [1973] 1 Q.B. 148, 151-52 (1972);
accord, In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 95
(H.L. 1977).
66. See James Nelson & Sons v. Nelson Line (Liverpool), Ltd., [1906] 2 K.B. 217 (C.A.).
67. The Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49,
§ 225, defines "party" as including "every person served with notice of or attending any pro-
ceeding, although not named on the record." See Eden v. Weardale Iron & Coal Co., 35 Ch.
D. 287, 295 (Ch. App. 1887). Discovery may be directed against one who is "in truth and in
substance" a party to the action, though not formally a party. James Nelson & Sons v. Nelson
Line (Liverpool), Ltd., [1906] 2 K.B. 217, 223 (C.A.) (dictum).
68. Walburn v. Ingilby, 1 MyL & K. 61, 81-83, 39 Eng. Rep. 604, 612-13 (Ch. 1833) (third
party considered agent of party to the action).
69. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 38, rule 14; id, rule 18.
70. At any stage in a cause or matter the Court may order any person to attend any
proceeding in the cause or matter and produce any document, to be specified or de-
scribed in the order, the production of which appears to the Court to be necessary for
the purpose of that proceeding.
Id. rule 13(l). Other exceptions include discovery in personal injury actions and inspection
under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879,42 & 43 Vict., c. 11. See 13 HALsBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND para. 17 (4th ed. 1975).
71. See Penn-Texas Corp. v. Murat Anstalt (No. 2), [1964] 2 Q.B. 647, 662-64 (C.A.).
72. See Radio Corp of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618 (1955); Burchart v.
Macfarlane, [1891] 2 Q.B. 241 (C.A.). Order 38, rule 13(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of Judicature provides: "No person shall be compelled by an order under paragraph (1) [see
note 70 supra] to produce any document at A proceeding in a cause or matter which he could
not be compelled to produce at the trial of that cause or matter."
73. See Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 645-48 (1955).
74. The opinions of the Lords in the Westinghouse case contain contradictory statements on
the applicability of the older cases. Lord Diplock would adhere to the rationale of the older
cases, asserting that "[u]nder the procedure of the High Court of England there is no power to
order discovery of documents by a person not a party to the action, but such a person can be
required by subpoena duces tecum to produce documents to the court." In re Westinghouse
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policy of "mutual judicial co-operation ' '7 5 that underlies the Convention76
to allow discovery of documents from nonparties despite the fact that the
non-parties' oral testimony is not required. But to be safe, a party seeking
discovery should probably plan to obtain documents from nonparties at
oral deposition.77
III
PRIVILEGE
Section 3 of the Evidence Act, dealing with privileges from discovery,
could well be the most significant provision for the attorney seeking to ob-
tain evidence in England.78 The Act recognizes two categories of privileges:
(1) those that are available in civil proceedings in the English court answer-
ing the request for evidence, 79 and (2) those that are available in civil pro-
ceedings in the requesting court.80
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 111 (H.L. 1977). Lord Keith of
Kinkel, on the other hand, states that
[i]n the present case the Court of Appeal has taken the view that on a proper con-
struction of the Act of 1975, the production of documents by a third party may be
ordered though not ancillary to the oral examination of that party as a witness. That
view is not now challenged and is plainly right.
I1d at 128.
75. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 95
(H.L. 1977) (quoting the Hague Convention, supra note 2, Preamble).
76. Hague Convention, supra note 2.
77. Discovery can also be resisted by asserting a privilege, see notes 79-140 infra and ac-
companying text; by a denial of relevance, see 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 38
(4th ed. 1975); and by an agreement between the parties not to disclose the documents, see id
para. 94.
78. Section 3(1) of the Act provides:
A person shall not be compelled by virtue of an order under section 2 above to give
any evidence which he could not be compelled to give-
(a) in civil proceedings in the part of the United Kingdom in which the court that
made the order exercises jurisdiction; or
(b) ...in civil proceedings in the country or territory in which the requesting court
exercises jurisdiction.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(1). In addition to the privi-
leges discussed below, a person may claim the legal professional (attorney-client) privilege.
See 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 71-85 (4th ed. 1975).
79. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(l)(a). For the text of
§ 3(l)(a), see note 78 supra. See generally 13 HALsBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 67-95
(4th ed. 1975). This category includes a "national security" privilege, which can be exercised
by a British Secretary of State; this privilege is set out in § 3(3) of the Act. For the text of§
3(3), see note 132 infra.
80. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(l)(b). For the text of
§ 3(l)(b), see note 78 supra.
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A. PRIVILEGES UNDER ENGLISH LAW
1. Self-incrimination
The common law privilege against self-incrimination, as codified in sec-
tion 14 of the Civil Evidence Act,8 ' allows a person to refuse to give testi-
mony or produce documents that might expose that person to criminal
prosecution or civil liability under English law.8 2 In the context of an anti-
trust suit, this privilege could be invoked by any witness who might be lia-
ble under either British antitrust law8 3 or the antitrust legislation of the
European Economic Community (EEC),8 4 which has the force of law in
Great Britain.8 5 There are, however, important reasons that a corporation
might prefer not to claim the privilege. The European Commission 86 has
extensive powers to investigate and prosecute violations of the EEC anti-
trust laws,87 and it appears that EEC law recognizes neither a self-
incrimination privilege nor even an attorney-client privilege.88 Hence, de-
pending on the seriousness of the consequences of disclosure, a corporation
might prefer to disclose quickly and quietly rather than claim the privilege
81. 1968, c. 64.
82. Id. § 14(l)(a). The American privilege against self-incrimination, by contrast, applies
only in criminal prosecutions. See note 133 infra.
83. The basic British antitrust statutes are the Resale Prices Act, 1976, c. 53; the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act, 1976, c. 34; and the Restrictive Practices Court Act, 1976, c. 33. See also
Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 41; Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1968, c. 66; Resale Prices Act,
1964, c. 58; Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68. For a general discussion
of British antitrust law written before the enactment of the 1976 consolidating acts, see Kint-
ner, Joelson, & Griffin, Recent Developments in United Kingdom 4ntitrust Law, 19 ANTITRUST
BULL. 217 (1974).
84. The basic provisions of EEC antitrust law are found in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; the corresponding enforcement provisions are
found in Rglement No. 17 Premier riglement d'application des articles 85 et 86 du trait, 5
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTP-S EUROPPENNES 204 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Regu-
lation No. 12].
Unlike American antitrust law, EEC antitrust law applies only to corporations ("undertak-
ings"). Treaty of Rome, supra, arts. 85-86. Such corporations, if found liable, can be sub-
jected to a very substantial fine. Regulation No. 17, supra, arts. 15-16. Hence, the British self-
incrimination privilege based on the threat of enforcement of EEC antitrust law can be
claimed by corporations but not by individuals. By contrast, the American privilege against
self-incrimination protects only individuals. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906). For a discussion of EEC antitrust law and a transla-
tion of the relevant documents, see D. BARouNos, D. HALL, & J.R. JAMES, EEC ANTI-TRUST
LAW (1975); BUsINESS INTERNATIONAL S.A., EUROPE'S RULES OF COMPETITION (1976).
85. European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2(1).
86. The Commission, pursuant to the Treaty of Rome, supra note 84, arts. 155-163, is a
nine-member body chosen "by the Governments of Member States acting in common agree-
ment," id. art. 158. Its responsibilities include "ensur[ing] the application of the provisions of
this Treaty" and "formulat[ing] recommendations or opinions in matters which are the subject
of this Treaty." Id. art. 155.
87. Regulation No. 17, supra note 84, arts. 9-16.
88. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 492, 497
(C.A.), aft'd, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
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and thus draw attention to possible violations of EEC law, risking prosecu-
tion in a very unfavorable forum. On the other hand, if the European Com-
mission already knows of the possible violations, or if the Commission is
unlikely to prosecute because of the prevailing political climate, little is lost
by claiming the privilege.8 9
There are several ways the party seeking discovery can defeat the claim
of privilege. First, the claimant must satisfy the court that there are reason-
able grounds for the assertion of privilege.90 The court will not uphold the
privilege if the claim is made in bad faith,9 1 or if there is no danger of
punishment because too much time has elapsed,92 the defendant has been
pardoned,93 or the offense has become obsolete. 94 Thus, if the European
Commission granted immunity to a prospective deponent, or declared arti-
cle 85 of the Treaty of Rome9 5 inapplicable to a certain case,96 or issued a
negative clearance, 97 the deponent could not claim the privilege.98 Finally,
the danger of criminal prosecution or civil proceedings99 must be "real and
appreciable," and not "some extraordinary and barely possible contin-
gency," for the privilege to arise. 1°° In the Westinghouse case the prospec-
tive deponent argued that, despite the theoretical chance of prosecution by
the European Commission, there was no real and appreciable risk since the
Commission had been aware of the existence of the cartel for five years, had
known for ten months of certain highly incriminating documents concern-
ing the cartel, and had not instituted an investigation.'10 The court held,
89. In the Westinghouse case, it appears that the European Commission had known about
the alleged uranium cartel's activities five years before the RTZ officials claimed the British
privilege against self-incrimination, and it seemed clear that the Commission would take no
action. See note 101 infra and accompanying text. The RTZ officials were therefore risking
little in claiming the privilege.
90. See National Ass'n of Operative Plasterers v. Smithies, [1906] A.C. 434; Ex Parle Reyn-
olds, 20 Ch. D. 294, 300 (Ch. App. 1882); The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep.
730 (Q.B. 1861); Adams v. Lloyd, 3 H. & N. 351, 362, 157 Eng. Rep. 506 (Ex. 1858).
91. See Ex Parte Reynolds, 20 Ch. D. 294, 300-01 (Ch. App. 1882).
92. Attorney-General v. Cunard S.S. Co., 4 T.L.R. 177 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1887); Roberts v.
Allatt, M. & M. 192, 173 Eng. Rep. 1128 (K.B. 1828).
93. The Queen v. Kinglake & Lovibond, 22 L.T.R. (n.s.) 316 (Somersetshire Lent Assizes
1870); The Queen v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861).
94. Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel, Ltd., [1942] 2 K.B. 253 (C.A.).
95. Treaty of Rome, supra note 84, art. 85; see note 84 supra.
96. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 84, art. 85(3).
97. Regulation No. 17, suzpra note 84, art. 2. A "negative clearance" is, in effect, a declara-
tory judgment that article 85 is not being violated.
98. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 441
(C.A.), rev'don add'Ifacts, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977). Whether the Commission would
take such action, or could be convinced to do so, would depend in large part on the current
political climate.
99. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
100. The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q.B. 1861).
101. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81,
90 (H.L. 1977); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R.
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however, that it was impossible to determine that the Commission would
never investigate the alleged cartel. Since the Commission was under a duty
to act if the evidence was sufficient, and since the evidence sought by West-
inghouse might be used by the Commission in deciding whether to investi-
gate and prosecute the cartel, the court concluded that the risk of
prosecution was real and substantial and that the privilege should be up-
held.' 02 Thus it seems that the privilege, once claimed, is not likely to be
denied.10 3
2 Public Interest (Crown) Privilege
It is a basic principle of English common law that testimony or produc-
tion of documents may be refused on the ground that disclosure of certain
information would be injurious to the public interest.1 4 This privilege105
is available in any proceeding at any time.1°6 Ordinarily the privilege is
claimed by the minister of the governmental department concerned, who
should have personally evaluated the content of the documents.107 But in
theory any person may raise the privilege,' 08 and it is arguably the duty of
the parties in private litigation to inform the Crown of the possibility that
disclosure of certain evidence may harm the public interest.109 In addition,
492, 497-98 (C.A.), aJ'd, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977); Financial Times (London), Oct. 26,
1977, at 10, col. 8. The statement by the European Commission, in response to a question
about the cartel, that the Commission was unable to "come to a conclusion as to the existence
of a cartel," provoked smiles in the European Parliament, probably because its intention not to
investigate the matter was obvious. [1977] 3 W.L.R. at 494.
102. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81, 89-
90 (H.L. 1977); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R.
492, 498 (C.A.), aj'd, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
103. In addition to the exceptions discussed here, there are certain statutory exceptions.
Eg., Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, § 14(3); Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 31(1); Crown Proceed-
ings Act, 1947, 10 & I 1 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 14. See also Commissioners of Customs & Excise v.
Ingram, [19481 1 All E.R. 927, 929 (C.A.).
104. The leading case on this subject, in which the history of the privilege is reviewed, is
Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910. Parliament has also recognized this principle. See
Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 28(l)-(2); RULES OF THE SUPREME
COURT (Eng.) Order 24, rule 15. For discussions of the equivalent privilege in American law,
see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (documents containing military secrets held
privileged); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (tapes of presidential conversations
held not privileged).
105. The traditional expression "crown privilege" has been criticized since the privilege
arises not from the special rights of the Crown but from the protection of the public interest.
See Rogers v. Home Secretary, [1973] A.C. 388, 400 (1972).
106. See 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 87 (4th ed. 1975).
107. Duncan v. Cammeil, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 638.
1 08. Rogers v. Home Secretary, [1973] A.C. 388, 400 (1972).
109. 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 88 (4th ed. 1975). The deponents in the
Westinghouse case advised the Crown of "the matters that [were] likely to be stated in evi-
dence, if the witnesses were re-examined," in the hope that the public interest privilege would
be invoked, Transcript at 14, In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation,
[1977] 3 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law
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the court is bound to assert the privilege when appropriate.1 0 The decision
whether to uphold the privilege is the court's, I I but the view of the minis-
ter is entitled to great weight. 1 2 The court will apply a balancing test i1 3
and forbid disclosure when the injury to the public interest by disclosure is
greater than that resulting from withholding the evidence.1 4 The privilege
is applicable, for example, "where disclosure would be injurious to national
defence, or to good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a
class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the pub-
lic service." 15
In judging the circumstances under which the public interest privilege
might attach in a foreign antitrust action, it is important to keep in mind
that the British attitude toward "public interest" differs significantly from
the attitude prevalent in America. First, the British views of government
secrecy and discovery in general could cause problems unforeseen by an
American. For example, the British are much less insistent than Americans
that all government information be made available to the public;" 16 argu-
ments aimed at the nondisclosure of evidence to protect government opera-
tions will therefore be considered more seriously in England than an
American might expect--especially in light of the generally cautious En-
glish attitude toward discovery.' ' 7 Second, the British concept of jurisdic-
tion is much more limited than the American view." 8 This difference has
led to conflicts in the past, particularly in the sensitive area of antitrust en-
Journal), and the British Attorney General intervened in the appeal before the House of
Lords, Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1977, at B-3, col. 3.
110. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, 941-43.
111. Section 3(3) of the Evidence Act establishes an exception to this rule where the evi-
dence is to be given under the Act and where, in the judgment of the Secretary of State,
disclosure of the evidence would be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom. In that
event a signed certificate from the Secretary to that effect will conclusively establish the privi-
lege. For the text of § 3(3), see note 132 infra.
112. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, 952.
113. Id. at 950-51.
114. Id. at 940.
115. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 642 (dictum). Examples of pro-
tected evidence include income tax documents, In re Joseph Hargreaves. Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 347
(Ch. App.); correspondence with the Secretary of War and minutes of a court of inquiry, Beat-
son v. Skene, 5 H. & N. 838, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415 (Ex. 1860); and communications between the
East India Company and the Board of Control, Smith v. East India Co., 1 Phil. Ch. 50,41 Eng.
Rep. 550 (Ch. 1841).
116. Compare the many English statutes protecting the secrecy of certain information, see
notes 125-32 infra and accompanying text, with the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976), and the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1241 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 39 U.S.C. (1976)). See Baker, supra note 4, at
168-71.
117. See generall, Kaplan, supra note 42, at 824-26. See also Stanford, supra note 30, at
204-06.
118. See Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957).
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forcement, 119 and has even led to legislation designed to protect English
jurisdiction from foreign intrusion.1 20 Thus, arguments that the jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom is being infringed upon would probably be seri-
ously considered by an English court. 12 1 In the Westinghouse case, for ex-
ample, the existence of a U.S. Department of Justice antitrust investigation
and the perceived threat it posed to British sovereignty were vigorously ar-
gued before the House of Lords,' 2 2 and were probably decisive in the
Lords' refusal to enforce the letters rogatory. 123 Furthermore, any effect on
England's relations with other countries that could result from disclosure of
119. Since the effects of commercial activity tend to spill over national boundaries, and
since American antitrust law is aimed at any activity that affects American trade, enforcement
of U.S. antitrust laws against activity taking place in foreign countries has led to controversy
and more than a little ill will abroad. See Address by Bell, supra note 30, at 2-3, 6-7; Stan-
ford, supra note 30. A good example of the jurisdictional complications that can arise in
multinational antitrust actions is the IC case, in which an American court ordered DuPont,
an American company, and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a British company, to divest
themselves of holdings in Canadian Industries Limited, a Canadian company. In addition,
the court ordered ICI to refrain from asserting rights in Britain under British patents. United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), sufpplemental opinion,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Soon thereafter, not surprisingly, a British court granted an
injunction restraining ICI from complying with the decree. British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v.
Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19 (Ch. App. 1952). As Lord Wilberforce observed
in Westinghouse, "It is axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one state may be to
defend what it is the policy of another state to attack." In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Ura-
nium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 94 (H.L. 1977).
It has been suggested that a strong factor behind the refusal of British and Canadian courts
to honor requests for pretrial discovery in antitrust cases under the prior evidence statutes was
resentment of the broad enforcement of American antitrust laws overseas in violation of what
was considered to be exclusive British or Canadian jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40, Reporters' Note 2 (1965);
Note, Judicial Cooperation in the Taking of Evidence Abroad-The Canada and Ontario Evi-
dence Acts, 8 TEx. INT'L L.J. 57, 60-68 (1973). See generally Stanford, supra note 30.
120. For example, the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, was
passed in response to U.S. Federal Maritime Commission investigations. See 698 PARL. DEB.
H.C. (5th ser.) 1215-84 (1964). See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping
Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960). Similarly, both Ontario and Quebec have enacted
statutes, in response to American antitrust investigations, that forbid the removal of corporate
records from those provinces pursuant to an order or subpoena from any governmental au-
thority of a jurisdiction outside the province. See Business Records Protection Act, ONT.
REY. STAT. c. 54 (1970); Business Concerns Records Act, QUE. REv. STAT. c. 278 (1964);
Henry, The United States Antitrust Laws:.4 Canadian Viewpoint, 8 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 273
(1970); Address by Roy M. Davidson, Senior Deputy Director, Canadian Bureau of Competi-
tion Policy, before the Canada-United States Law Institute, The Canadian Response to the
Overseas Reach of United States Antitrust Law 3-4 (Sept. 30, 1977) (copy on file at the offices
of the Cornell International Law Journal).
121. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81,
94, 125 (H.L. 1977). Indeed, article 12(b) of the Hague Convention, supra note 2, specifically
allows a court to consider whether granting the request would prejudice the sovereignty or
security of the requested state.
122. See Cheeseright, U.S. criticised in RTZ case, Financial Times (London), Oct. 21, 1977,
at 8, cols. 2, 4.
123. Her Majesty's Government regards as an unacceptable invasion of its own sover-
eignty the use of the United States courts by the United States Government as a means
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controversial information would undoubtedly bear directly on protection of
the "public interest."' 124
3. Statutory Privileges
A number of British statutes forbid the disclosure of certain kinds of in-
formation, and a litigant seeking evidence may find that it cannot lawfully
be disclosed. For example, 125 a party may not disclose certain information
relating to national security 126 or commercial information obtained by the
British Government under statutory powers.127 In addition, the Shipping
Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 128 empowers the British Board
of Trade to forbid the furnishing of any commercial document to a foreign
court if doing so would infringe upon "the jurisdiction which, under inter-
national law, belongs to the United Kingdom."'129 This statute was not in-
voked in the Westinghouse case, but since extraterritorial antitrust cases
raise hotly disputed jurisdictional issues,130 it might well be invoked in a
similar case to defeat discovery.' 3 ' Finally, the Evidence Act forbids dis-
by which it can investigate activities outside the United States of British companies
and individuals which it claims infringe the anti-trust laws of the United States.
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 115 (H.L.
1977) (Lord Diplock).
124. This consideration is particularly relevant in the Westinghouse case since Westing-
house alleged that the cartel included the governments of Canada, Australia, South Africa,
and France. Indeed, it was reported that these four governments put strong pressure on the
British Government not to force the RTZ officials to testify. See The Times (London), July
26, 1977, at 17, col. 7.
125. Other statutory limitations on disclosure involve information relating to adopted chil-
dren, Adoption Act, 1958, 7 Eliz. 2, c. 5, § 20(5); agriculture, Agriculture Marketing Act, 1958,
6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 47, § 47(2)-(3); and census and population statistics, Population (Statistics) Act,
1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 12, § 4(2); Census Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 41, § 8(2).
126. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 80, § 11, 13; Official Secrets Act,
1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 2(1), asamendedbyOfficial Secrets Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75,
§§ 9(l), 10, sched. 1.
127. See, e.g., Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 41, § 133; Sea Fish Industry Act, 1970, c. 1i, § 42;
Statistics of Trade Act, 1947, 10 & I 1 Geo. 6, c. 39, § 9; Coal Industry Nationalisation Act,
1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 59, § 56.
128. 1964, c. 87, modoed by Transfer of Functions (Shipping and Construction of Ships)
Order 1965, 1965 STAT. INsT. No. 145, as amendedby Industrial Expansion Act, 1968, c. 32, §§
14(l), 18(2), sched. 4.
129. Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87; § 2(l)(b).
130. See notes 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
131. It does not appear to be difficult to prove an infringement of British jurisdiction under
the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87. In 1968, the British
Board of Trade applied the Shipping Act against an order by the U.S. Federal Maritime Com-
mission, stating that "insofar as the said Order applies to things done or to be done outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States of America by persons carrying on business in the
United Kingdom it constitutes an infringement of the jurisdiction which under international
law belongs to the United Kingdom." See Shipping Contracts (Foreign Measures) Order
1968, 1968 STAT. INST. No. 1382, para. 6(b). There is no requirement in the Act that the
Board of Trade.balance British interests against the interests of the foreign governments in-
volved, and an order of the Board, while subject to "annulment in pursuance of a resolution of
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closing any evidence if a British Secretary of State certifies that the disclo-
sure "would be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom."' 32
B. PRIVILEGES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
The most significant privilege arising under American law that would
affect discovery proceedings abroad is the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.13 3 Whether or not the privilege applies is, of course, de-
termined solely by reference to American law.' 34 The procedure for claim-
ing the privilege is set out in section 3(2) of the Evidence Act and in the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature. 135 If the claim of privilege is
supported by a statement of the requesting court or is conceded by the re-
questing party, production of the evidence will not be compelled. Other-
wise, the evidence as to which the privilege is claimed will be taken
provisionally and transmitted to the requesting court only if that court rules
against the claim of privilege.' 36 The net effect of claiming the fifth amend-
ment privilege under the Evidence Act would therefore be no different from
claiming the privilege in an American court; no arguments for or against
either House of Parliament," does not appear to be subject to judicial review. Shipping Con-
tracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, § 1(3).
132. [A] person shall not be compelled by virtue of an order under section 2. . . to give
any evidence if his doing so would be prejudicial to the security of the United King-
dom; and a certificate signed by or on behalf of the Secretary of State to the effect that
it would be so prejudicial for that person to do so shall be conclusive evidence of that
fact.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(3). Such an order appar-
ently is not subject to judicial review.
England has no law specifically forbidding the disclosure of information concerning the
alleged uranium cartel. Australia, Canada, and South Africa all have such laws, however,
some of which were passed in response to the Westinghouse litigation. See Foreign Proceed-
ings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121 (Austl.), as amended by Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No. 202 (Austl.), asimplemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S.214 (Nov. 29, 1976);
Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/77-836, 111 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at 4619 (1977)
(replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/76-644, 110 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at
2747 (1976)); Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30, 15 STAT. REPUB. So. AFR. 1045 (1977).
It is not inconceivable that England might have adopted such a law under pressure from these
three countries had the House of Lords ordered disclosure of the disputed evidence.
133. "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Compare the British privilege against self-incrimination, see
notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(l)(b). For the
text of § 3(l), see note 78 supra. See also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract
Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 441 (C.A.), rev'd on add'i facts, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.
1977); Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 (b).
135. RULES oF THE SUPREME COURT (Eng.) Order 70, rule 6.
136. Id. In the Westinghouse litigation, provisional taking of evidence was unnecessary
since Judge Merhige, who was presiding over the contract actions in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, went to London to preside over the deposition and to rule on
the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Ura-
nium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 90 (H.L. 1977).
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the use of the privilege arise solely as a result of the evidence being taken in
Great Britain.' 37
A grant of immunity from the appropriate American authorities invali-
dates a claim of privilege under the fifth amendment. 38 The Department of
Justice has a firm policy against granting immunity in civil litigation to
which the United States is not a party; 3 9 in fact, Westinghouse may be the
first case in which this has ever been done.' 40 This single grant of immunity
almost certainly does not indicate a sharp change in the policy of the De-
partment of Justice. Nevertheless, it is possible that immunity will be
granted in future civil cases involving large cartels or other antitrust viola-
tions that have a significant impact on the American economy if the De-
partment cannot obtain the information it needs through more direct
means.
CONCLUSION
English discovery law, while similar in many respects to American law,
contains a number of political and legal pitfalls that an American attorney
might not expect. The most important of these are the validity of the re-
quest for evidence, the availability under English law of the particular dis-
covery sought, and the question of privilege. An examination of the
provisions of the new Evidence Act reveals the framework through which
discovery in England for foreign tribunals may be compelled, and suggests
ways in which an American attorney can elude or use many obstacles to
discovery.
Alexander C. Black
137. If the court requesting the evidence either is not an American court or is not applying
American law, a deponent cannot claim the fifth amendment privilege, even if the testimony
will clearly subject the deponent to criminal liability under American law. See Evidence
(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34, § 3(l)(b).
138. The United States immunity statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976), providing for immu-
nity granted by an order of the court, and 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976), providing for immunity
granted by a U.S. Attorney with the approval of either the Attorney General or a Deputy or
Assistant Attorney General.
139. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney General, to William B. Cummings 1 (July
12, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
140. Memorandum of Views Furnished for the Honourable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. by Link-
laters & Paines 21-22, In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, M.D.L.
No. 75-235 (E.D. Va., filed Dec. 23, 1975) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell Interna-
tionalLawJournal). The only case the Department of Justice cited as precedent for its grant
of immunity in the Westinghouse case was In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District,
Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976). Memorandum, supra note 14, at 9. That case,
however, involved criminal violations of Japanese income tax laws and was not a civil action.
Moreover, the case involved a joint investigation by Japanese and American authorities, so it
is arguable that the U.S. Government was involved in the case. Memorandum of Views,
supra at 22-25.
